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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

There is a need for better cost estimating and forecasting for highway work m the
Commonwealth of Kentucky.

The objectives of this study, approved July 1993, are to

investigate current practices and to recommend improvements for the estimating process. This
report details the findings of the first three years of the research effort and outlines the path
forward.

The Kentucky Transportation Cabinet (KyTC) is responsible for the creation of a six-year
highway construction plan listing proposed projects which reflect the highway needs of the
state.

The General Assembly approves those projects that will be funded in the coming

biennium. Reasonable cost forecasts for new and ongoing projects are required to ensure that
funding is available and projects can be advanced on an orderly schedule.

KRS45.245, effective 1 July, 1992, grants the Interim Joint Committee on Transportation
(IJCT) oversight of the biennial highway plan. Any phase of an authorized highway project-design, right-of-way, utility relocation, or construction--that exceeds the estimate shown in
the plan by 15% must be reviewed by the IJCT. Estimates developed using current methods
have not proven sufficiently accurate to preclude cost overruns in excess of 15%. To date
(7/1/92- 7/1/96), 362 overruns totaling over $162 million, have been submitted to the IJCT-all have been approved for additional funding.* No concerted effort was made to track the
number of cost underruns.

Estimates for highway projects are usually the responsibility of the 12 District Highway
Offices, which have few resources allotted to estimating. Furthermore, initial estimates, based
on very little information, don't statistically support a ±15% confidence level. In light of the
high variability of estimates based on little information and the lack of resources dedicated to
estimating, a reasonable approach is to base estimates on actual costs of past projects. For the

* Six additional overruns for the 1994 biennium were processed after this report was prepared.
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conceptual estimate, the one used for initial authorization of a project, a cost-per-mile figure
based on similar past projects can be used. After the design is completed on a new project,
estimates for the remaining phases--right-of-way, utility relocation, and construction--can be
updated to reflect design decisions such as route, grade and drain, etc.

A cost-per-mile model, KYEstimate, has been developed to assist estimators in making
conceptual estimates based on databases of preconstruction and construction project costs for
the past five years.

Emphasis for Year 4 of this study will be to enlarge the preconstruction and construction
databases, refine KYEstimate, and develop and implement a training plan for the use of the
model.
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INTRODUCTION

There is a need for better cost estimating and forecasting for highway work in the
Commonwealth of Kentucky. This need has been recognized by the Kentucky Transportation
Cabinet (KyTC), the Kentucky Legislature and the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA).
A research project was approved by the KyTC and the FHWA, starting in July 1993, to study
current practices and to recommend improvements for the estimating process. The project
timetable specifies the following annual goals:

•

Year 1 (7/93-6/94) - Study current practices and problems, and make preliminary
recommendations for potential improvement areas.

•

Year 2 (7/94-6/95) - Develop and/or modify procedures and tools to improve the
estimating process.

•

Year 3 (7/95-6/96) - Implement improvements and train KyTC personnel in their use.

•

Year 4 (7/96-6/97) - Collect additional cost data, refine KYEstimate and train KyTC
personnel in its use.

•

Year 5 (7/97-6/98)- Collect additional cost data and refine KYEstimate.

The impetus for improving cost forecasting for highway work comes from a law enacted
during the 1992 General Assembly session. KRS 45.245, effective July 1, 1992, mandates
that the amount authorized for expenditure on any project phase--design, right-of-way, utility
relocation or construction--cannot exceed that stated in the current biennium highway plan
(2YP) by more than 15% without being presented by the KyTC to the Legislature's Interim
Joint Committee on Transportation (IJCT) for review. The presentation to the IJCT must
include written certification from the State Highway Engineer that .the overrun was caused by
unanticipated circumstances, and provide specific details on the reasons for the cost overrun.
The IJCT determines if the proposed additional money is reasonable and necessary, and also,
if any alteration made or planned since its consideration by the General Assembly materially
changed the project.

This, the third interim report, discusses the findings of the first three years of the project:
•

Summary of First Year's Findings - reviews the research findings presented in the first
interim report, March 1994.

•

Summary of Second Year's Findings - reviews the research findings presented in the
second interim report, July 1995.

•

Estimates During the Period of Study - presents an analysis of the cost. overruns >15%
during the research period.

•

Cost-per-mile Model - presents a computer model, KYEstimate, that sorts data from the
preconstruction and construction databases to assist an estimator in making an estimate
based on past performance.

•

Conclusions - reports conclusions based on research findings to date.

•

Preliminary Recommendations - makes recommendations based on the research effort to
date.

•

Path Forward- work to be accomplished during the fourth year of the research.
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SUMMARY OF FIRST YEAR'S FINDINGS

The section provides a summary of the status of the research effort when the first interim
report was issued in March 1994. The statements used reflect conditions at that time and may
be updated later in this report to reflect current conditions.

The current process of forecasting costs for highway work in Kentucky isn't satisfactory to
either the KyTC or the Legislature. The reason seems to be not so much that the cost
forecasting ability of the KyTC has declined of late, but that the Legislature has voted itself
more oversight of the 2YP execution.

The reporting requirements of the oversight law,

KRS45.245, impose additional burdens on an already seriously understaffed highway
department. The limits imposed, whereby reporting is required, are in some cases impossible
to meet, and in other cases possible to meet only with additional staffing and/or by not
performing current duties.

The choice seems to be to either accept the status quo or to try to mitigate the problem;
solving the problem entirely--insuring that no project phase overruns its estimate by 15%--is
not feasible. There are three ways to mitigate the problem of poor cost forecasting. The first
is for the Legislature to either forego the oversight or to modif'y it so the KyTC can meet the
requirements with current staffing levels, the second is for the KyTC to change how the 6YP
and the 2YP are developed, and the third is for the KyTC to staff up as necessary to improve
its estimating ability. All of these options have financial and political implications.

The current oversight requirement had resulted in 134 overruns worth over $69 million being
presented to the IJCT for review during the current biennium to date (7/1/92 - 2/13/94). All
of these overruns were approved.

The IJCT makes no concerted effort to track cost

underruns, which would provide as much evidence of poor cost forecasting as overruns do.
The oversight seems to be used not so much to improve KyTC's cost forecasting ability as it
is to make a political statement about who is in charge of getting highways constructed in the
Commonwealth. If this is indeed the case, and if blanket approval of all overruns is assured,
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then perhaps a continuation of the status quo is acceptable. However, currently the KyTC is
trying to appease the IJCT by increasing estimates to reduce the possibility of having to report
phase overruns in the future. This practice makes the development of a realistic 6YP and 2YP
impossible, and has the potential of causing the loss of federal funds if and when there aren't
enough projects in the 6YP ready to be advanced into the 2YP to utilize approved federal aid.

The Legislature could either forego the oversight or modifY it so the KyTC can meet the
requirements with current staffing levels. A statute change would be required to forego the
oversight or to change its provisions. Modifications that could mitigate the current problem
include setting a realistic limit for both overruns and underruns based on the class of estimate
in the 2YP, not 15% across the board; track overruns by overall project cost instead of by
project phase; and/or establish a review process that requires the KyTC to inform the IJCT by
report of all overruns and underruns, but to formally respond with backup data to only those
overruns the IJCT truly thinks may need to be examined, not those that will be summarily
approved.

The KyTC can change how the 6YP and the 2YP are developed. The most effective change
would be to complete either an in-depth scoping study and/or preliminary design prior to
adding a project to the 6YP. This would require that work performed prior to authorization
of the 6YP be funded by state funds.

The KyTC can staff up to improve its estimating ability. Increased staffing would require
either the Executive Branch's approval for hiring additional personnel and/or KyTC's
commitment to reallocate resources. The increased staffing would primarily include right-ofway and utility personnel to be involved in preliminary estimating. Also, demands for on-thespot estimates would have to be curtailed so the increased staff could scope the proposed
project prior to submitting the initial estimate.

The three ways to mitigate the current problem are being used, to some degree, by other
states.

The largest notable difference between Kentucky and most other states is the
4

legislative oversight requirement. While many states have some sort of progress review of the
highway plan, almost none have legislative involvement after budget approval. Many states
are better staffed for estimating than Kentucky and some states do a considerable amount of
preliminary design work prior to a project being placed on the highway plan.

Regardless of which of the above-mentioned options, or combinations thereof, are selected to
mitigate the current problem, improvement of the current estimating and cost forecasting
process is possible. Areas this study will address during the next year are: how to better use
existing data, what unused data sources are available, and how to improve current estimating
procedures.

Estimates are a product of experience and information.

Estimating experience has been

disappearing rapidly in the KyTC. It is vitally important to develop databases and make them
available to personnel throughout the state. These databases will not only improve estimating
ability but will serve to help justify estimates that later tum out to be inaccurate.

This study offers an opportunity to make improvements to the KyTC's cost forecasting ability
and to the relationship between the KyTC and the Legislature.

In order to seize this

opportunity, both the Legislature and the KyTC must communicate openly with each other,
and with the researcher, in an effort to find a workable solution which considers both political
and fiscal realities.
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SUMMARY OF SECOND YEAR'S FINDINGS

The second interim report, issued in July 1995, is summarized in this section. Statements
used in this section of the report reflect conditions at that particular time, and may be
changed later to represent current conditions.

Research continues to show that the Legislature must either forego the oversight or
modify it so the KyTC can meet requirements with the current staffing levels, the KyTC
must change how the 6YP and the 2YP are developed, and/or the KyTC must increase its
staff to improve the estimates.
The current oversight requirement had resulted in 263 overruns worth over $116 million
being presented to the UCT since the law became effective (7/1/92- 7/1/95). All of these
overruns were approved. The IJCT continued to make no concerted effort to track cost
underruns.

Revelant cost data for both preconstruction and construction phases were collected to
provide estimators with cost from past projects. These projects were stored in a manner
that efficiently allowed estimators to select data useful to their current project.

Projects in both databases were defined by twelve key attributes:
1
2
3
4
5
6

District
Item#
County
Type of work
Functional classification
Number of lanes

7
8
9
10
11
12

Length
Percent bridge length
Number of bridges or major culverts
Award year
Route Name
TD-10 Number

District - state highway district or districts; by number 1 - 12
Item # - district identifier number
County - county or counties; by name
Type of work- FHWA Order M5600.1A, 12/87 (see appendix)
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Functional classification - KyTC classification system (see appendix)
Number of lanes - number oflanes involved
Length - length in miles to three decimal points
Percent bridge length - [bridge length/project length]
Number of bridges- total number of bridges (or culverts> $50,000) in project
Award year- calendar year project was awarded for construction
Route Name- number of road: US60, KY109, etc.
TD-1 0 Number- number on the Project Authorization Form
Along with the above attributes was the cost of each preconstruction phase or
construction phase and the fiscal year of the project. The search for data was limited to
the last four years because of missing data related to the twelve attributes.

Key

characteristics were missing from many of the projects, precluding their inclusion in the
databases.

The cost per mile model, KYEstimate, was written in Microsoft EXCEL 5.0 and designed
to aid in the estimating process. The program would allow estimators to access the
databases and select past projects that were similar to a project they wanted to estimate.
The program used the length of the project and total cost to calculate the unit cost of the
project. The estimators could then use the historical data or enter their own estimate
based upon their past experience. A summary sheet of all pertinent information about the
estimate could be printed and/or saved for later reference. The model was still under
development.

A model was also under development using a cost per parcel concept for the right-of-way
phase. This program was also developed in Microsoft EXCEL 5.0. The database was
defined by attributes such as: parcel number, owner's name, parcel type, cost of parcel,
area of parcel, building purchase, and litigation.

The model and data seemed to be

insufficient for determining an accurate cost per parcel. There was an extremely high
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variation in values for similar projects, and as a result, this method for developing a
conceptual estimate for the right-of-way phase was abandoned.

A questionnaire was sent to the twelve district highway offices asking about the current
process for developing conceptual estimates; seventy percent were returned. Responses
showed that although most estimators were comfortable with their conceptual estimates,
they were not sure what constituted a good conceptual estimate because of lack of
feedback.

Performance measurements that were being investigated included:

Actual cost of project phases vs. Estimated cost of project phases
Number of projects let vs. Number of projects planned to let
Actual Revenues vs. Estimated Revenues
Number of projects negotiated vs. Number of projects litigated
Amount of money received from federal turnovers at end of the federal FY
Standard Deviation of: [[A- E]/A]*lOO for each year
Number of project overruns
Number of project underruns

The current process of forecasting costs for highway work in Kentucky isn't satisfactory
to either the KyTC or the Legislature. The overrun threshold, > 15%, is arbitrary and
causes much wasted effort by KyTC personnel.

It would be more effective to use

different thresholds for different phases. Another alternative would be to update estimates
once the design phase is completed and a better scope of work is determined.

An

improvement to the current process would be to require that only overruns over a certain
amount be formally presented to the IJCT and others require only a paper notification.
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ESTIMATES DURING THE PERIOD OF STUDY

Estimates developed using current methods have not proven sufficiently accurate to preclude
cost overruns in excess of 15%. Since the law became effective, (7/1/92 - 7/1/96), 362
overruns, totaling $162,487,511 have been submitted to the IJCT. * All have been approved
for additional funding.

The following analysis is based on information compiled from all past coptes of

the

Notification to Legislature's Interim Joint Committee on Transportation Concerning
Project Phase Cost Overruns > 15%. This document, an overrun summary, is submitted by
the KyTC to the IJCT for a phase overrun >15% and is identified by a tracking number.

Figure 2 shows a breakdown of the number of overrun occurrences, by phase. Figure 3 shows
a breakdown of overrun costs, by phase.

Design
4%

Figure 1 - Overrun Occurrences by Phase

Figure 2 - Overrun Costs by Phase

* Six additional overruns for the 1994 biennium were processed after this report was prepared.
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Table 1 shows the cost and frequency breakdown, by phase, of the 362 overruns to date.
Tables 2-5 show specific overrun causes for each phase and the number of occurrences of
each. Because some overruns have more than one cause listed, the total number of cause
occurrences may be higher than the total number of overruns for a phase.

Entries in the

column, Contributing Track Numbers, refer to the specific documents where a cause is
used as justification for an overrun.

A brief synopsis of the impact of the overruns in each

phase is also provided. For comparison, the figures from the 1992 biennium are found in
brackets beside the updated figures.

Table 1: Breakdown of Highway Cost Estimate Overruns by Phase.
Number of
Occurrences

% Occurring •

Design

47 [20]

Right-of-way

Total Cost of
Phase Overruns

%Cost

13.0 [11.0]

$6,946,919
[$1,900,000]

4.3
[2.3]

88 [43]

24.3 [23.6]

$22,575,500
[$9,220,500]

13.9
[11.2]

Utility Relocation

90 [54]

24.9 [29.7]

$27,963,568
[$18,781,000]

17.2
[22.9]

Construction

137 [65]

37.8 [35.7]

$105,001,524
[$52, 148,035]

64.6
[63.6]

362 [182]

100.0

$162,487,511
[$82,049,535]

100.0

Phase

Totals=

**

* percent of the 362 overruns that occurred in each phase
**percent of the total cost of the 362 overruns ($162,487,511) attributable to phase
Design Phase Overruns
Overruns in the design phase accounted for 13.0% of the total number and 4.3% of the total
cost of all overruns: forty-seven (47) overruns @ $6,946,919.

Table 2 shows that

underestimation of the complexity of the project, underestimation because consultant fees
were higher than the estimated in-house design costs, and scope changes due to worse than
expected site conditions were the three primary causes for design phase overruns. These
causes accounted for 61.1% of all design phase overruns, slightly lower than the 65.0% from
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the previous biennium.

Three justifications were used during the 1994 biennium only;

underestimation of cost of bridge inspection effort, part of design inadvertently omitted, and
additional administration costs accounted for 13.1% of the design overruns in the 1994
biennium. While there were 20 causes for design phase overruns in the 1992 biennium, there
were 34 in the 1994 biennium, an increase of 70%. Over the last biennium, the number of
overruns occurring and the cost attributed to the design phase has risen 2. 0%.

Table 2: Breakdown of Design Phase Overruns.
Number of
Occurrences as
Causes for Design
Phase Overruns

% Occurrence
(%of All
Design Phase
Overruns).

Contributing Track
Numbers

underestimation of complexity of project
necessitating further design effort over
what was originally envisioned

16 [4)

29.6 [20.0)

12, 14,53,54,55,59,
65, 71,79, 121,146,
152 [5,88,89,143)

underestimation because consultant fees
were higher than the estimated in-house
design costs

9 [6)

16.7 [30.0)

71,77,79
[98,99,106,128,
139,140]

scope changes due to site conditions being
worse than expected

8 [3)

14.8 [15.0)

48,164,169,172,173
[53,96,109]

initial estimate based on preliminary plans,
maps, and data

6 [2)

11.1 [10.0]

49,159,163,169
[25,37)

original estimate doesn't account for inhouse evaluation of routine design project
outlays and metric units

4 [3)

7.4 [15.0]

172 [144,145,146)

underestimation of cost of bridge
inspection effort

3 [OJ

5.6 [0.0]

25,42,43

part of design inadvertently omitted

3[0)

5.6 [0.0]

111,121,172

scope changes due to local and public
pressure & involvement

2 [1)

3.7 [5.0)

79 [67]

shift in alignment necessitating a greater
design effort than what was initially
estimated

2 (I]

3. 7 [5.0]

174 [2)

additional administration costs

1(0]

1.9 [0.0]

77

54 [20)

100

Cause/Justification
of Overrun

Totals=
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Right-of-way Overruns
Overruns in the right-of-way phase accounted for 24.3% of the total number and 13.9% of the
total cost of all overruns: eighty-eight (88) overruns @ $22,575,500. Table 3 shows that the
leading causes for right-of-way overruns in the 1992 biennium were changes in project scope
made during the design phase and after the initial estimate was made. The leading cause in the
1994 biennium was that the estimate was made with very preliminary plans, maps, and data.
Both of these causes together total 59.7% of the right-of-way overruns, as compared to the
last biennium, 70.3% Scope changes in design arose for a variety of reasons. Oftentimes,
changes were made to provide an improved facility over what was originally envisioned. At
other times, design calculations (i.e., hydraulic analysis, sight distance requirements, traffic
impact studies, etc.) led to changes involving different right-of-way parcels demands. These
design changes included shifts in roadway alignment, widening of the proposed roadway and
lengthening of bridges and approaches.

New justifications to the 1994 biennium were

acquisition of utility easements and settling of right-of-way parcels to speed up the process.
Causes of right-of-way overruns in the 1992 biennium numbered 54, as compared to 114 in
the 1994 biennium. That is an 111% increase in causes. The percent occurring of right-ofway overruns has increased by 0.7 and the percent cost of the overruns has increased by 2.7.

Table 3: Breakdown of Right-of-way Phase Overruns.
Contributing Track
Numbers

Cause/Justification
of Overrun

Number of
Occurrences as
Causes for ROW
Phase Overruns

% Occurrence
(%of All ROW
Phase Overruns)

initial estimate made with very
preliminary plans, maps, and generalized
data: estimate updated based on more
design detail

36 [18]

31.6 [33.3]

8,26,41 ,50,56,57 ,58,61'
89,91,92,93,94,96, 103,
118,135,138
[3,6, 7 ,9,10,16,40,59,69,
71,102,105,117,124,130,
152,154,159]

changes in project scope as a result of
decisions made in design

32 [20]

28.1 [37.0]

10, 11,16,21,23,39,51,52,
58,62,89,116
[3,24,51,55,62,63, 70,
71,76,83,86,95,108,117,
118,127,139,140,141,
!58]

(contmued on next page)
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Table 3: Breakdown of Ril!ht-of-way Phase Overruns. (continued)
unusually high jury award

12 [!]

10.5 [1.9]

58,88,90,102,116,
118,139, !53, !54, !60,161
[132]

land values increased in vicinity of
proposed right-of-way

9 [2]

7.9 [3.7]

10,56,85,93,112,138,144
[16, 1581

changes in project scope as a result of
worse than expected site conditions

8 [3]

7.0 [5.6]

38,57,61,93,132
[38,59,136]

inadvertent omission

6 [5]

5.3 [9.3]

50 [1,58,70,76,158]

improvement made to right-of-way after
initial estimate was made

6 [2]

5.3 [3.7]

57,123,145,!58 [72,133]

new or modified legislation enacted after
initial estimate made

3 [3]

2.6 [5.6]

[16,51,64]

acquisition of utility easements (usually
part of the utility phase)

1 [0]

0.9 [0.0]

!0

settling of ROW parcel to speed up
process

1 [0]

0.9 [0.0]

24

114 [54]

100

Totals=

Utility Relocation Phase Overruns

Overruns in the utility relocation phase have decreased (unlike any other phase) since the 1992
biennium. They currently accounting for 24.9% of the total number and 17.2% of the total
cost of all overruns: ninety (90) overruns @ $27,963,568.

Table 4 shows that the most

frequent cause for utility relocation overruns, like that for the right-of-way phase, came from
the initial estimate being made with very preliminary plans, maps and generalized data.
Similarly, the second leading cause for utility relocation phase overruns was due to changes
made in the project scope during the design phase. Combined, these two causes account for
57.3% of all the utility relocation phase overruns, somewhat less than the 70% last biennium.
The cause of overruns in the utility phase has decreased by almost 26% since the 1992
biennium, going from 70 causes to just 52. The number of utility overruns occurring and the
cost attributed to them have both dropped by about 5%.
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Table 4: Breakdown of Utility Relocation Phase Overruns.
Cause/Justification
of Overrun

Number of
Occurrences as
Causes for Utility
relocation Phase
Overruns

% Occurrence
(%of All
Utility
Relocation
Phase
Overruns).

Contributing Track
Numbers

initiaJ estimate made with very
preliminary plans, maps, and generalized
data. Estimate updated based on more
design detail

37 [22]

30.3 [31.4]

6,9,41,57,61,64,83,84,89,
91,97,134,136,140,155
[3,6,7,9,22,23,36,39,60,68,
69,71,82,95,102,105,117.
124,133,152,153,154]

changes in project scope as a result of
decisions made in design

33 [27]

27.0 [38.6]

13,18,21,31,32,89
[3 ,4,50,51,52,55,62,71,7 5,
77,86,87,90,95,103,104,
117,119,120,122,123,127,
131,134,137,141,159]

increase in relocation costs over what was
expected

21 [6]

17.2 [8.6]

1,2,13,17,31,57 ,63, 72,95,
96,97,117,133,155,162
[48,49,51,62,120,129]

changes in scope due to worse than
expected site conditions

11 [3]

9.0 [4.3]

13,22,38,61, 72,110,122,
133 [38,71,82]

inadvertent omission

10 [8]

8.2 [11.4]

31,119
[8,11,49,52,82,91,135,159]

underestimation of state force
involvement cost

7 [2]

5.7 [2.9]

31,72,110,117,133
[120,129]

new installation in proposed ROW after
estimate made

3 [2]

2.5 [2.9]

1 [48,120]

122 [70]

100

Totals=

Construction Phase Overruns
Overruns in the construction phase accounted for 37. 8% of the total number and 64.6% of the
total cost of all overruns >15%: one hundred thirty-seven (137) overruns@ $105,001,524.
The majority of overruns to date still occur in the construction phase. In addition, the
construction phase still comprises the largest percentage of the total overrun cost. Table 5
shows that the three leading causes for construction overruns were higher than expected unit
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bid prices and/or individual work item costs, changes in project scope as a result of changes
made in the design phase, and changes in scope due to worse than expected site conditions.
These three causes made up nearly two-thirds of the construction overruns at 63.5%. Higher
than expected unit bid prices and/or individual work item costs saw one of the biggest
increases over the two bienniums with about 125%.

Two justifications, change in KyTC

policy for contingency percent add-on and poor initial estimate, were new to the 1994 ·
biennium.

The 1992 biennium had a total of 94 causes attributing to construction cost

overruns, while the 1994 biennium had 14 7. That's a 56% increase in causes. The overall
occurrence of construction overruns and total cost of those overruns had both increased by
2.1% and 1%, respectively.

Table 5: Breakdown of Construction Phase Overruns.

Cause/Justification
of Overrun

Number of
Occurrences as
Causes for
Construction Phase
Overruns

% Occurrence
(%of All
Construction
Phase
Overruns).

Contributing Track
Numbers

ltigher than expected unit bid prices
and/or individual work item costs

75 [23]

31.1 [24.5]

3,4, 7, 19,20,28,29,30,3 3,35,
36,37,44,46,47,60,66,67,68,
75,76,81,82,86,98,99,100,
105,106,107,108,109,113,
114,115,120,124,125,126,
127,129,130,131,142,148,
149,151,156,157,165,166,
167[12, 15, 19,20,21,26,28,
34,35,42,43,44,46,47,54,56,
57,66, 79,142,147,151, 157]

changes in project scope as a result of
decisions made in design

44 [30]

18.3 [31.9]

5, 7, 15,33,45,66,69, 100,113,
130,141,143,170,171
[13,18,21,26,30,31,34,35,
41,46,54,56,61,66,74,79,
80,101,107,110,111,112,
125,126,147,148, 149, !50,
151,155]

changes in scope due to worse than
expected site conditions

34 [20]

14.1 [21.3]

20,27,46,47 ,70,75,82, 114,
124,148,149, !50, 151, !56
[ 14,17,27 ,32,33,65,73, 74,
78,82,84,85,92,94,97, 112,
113,142,151, 156]

(contmued on next page)
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Table 5: Breakdown of Construction Phase Overruns. (continued)
inadvertent omission

18 [6]

7.5 [6.4]

19,45,69, 100,105,106,131,
137,150,151,156,168
[19,42,43,85, 93, 10 I]

utility work done in construction phase

16 [5]

6.6 [5.3]

3,5, 7,34,60,66,76,81, 113,
156,168
[45,116, 126,150, !57]

initial estimate made with very
preliminary plans, maps, and
generalized data: estimate updated
based on more design detail

16 [4]

6.6 [4.3]

46,4 7,80,81, 109,114,127,
128,129,142,143,167
[15,29,57,81]

change in KyTC policy for contingency
percent add-on

13 [0]

5.4 [0.0]

30,35,36,45,46,47,67 ,68,86,
148,149,!50,151

addition of work materials to make
safe facility realized during the
construction phase

7 [I]

2.9 [1.1]

27,40, 113,131,147, IS I
[138]

complexity of construction
underestimated

6 [2]

2.5 [2.1]

4,67,81, 86 [21,157]

poor initial estimate

5 [0]

2.1 [0.0]

98,101,107,142,168

bonuses for minimal traffic impact
given

3 [I]

1.2 [1.1]

124,156 [85]

higher than expected inspection costs

2 [I]

0.8 [1.1]

114 [97]

two separate construction phases
combined to minimize overall cost to
state

2 [I]

0.8 [1.1]

80 [100]

241 [94]

100

Totals=

The following conclusions can be drawn from the data presented in Tables 1-5.
•

While design phase overruns account for 13.0% of all overruns, they only account for
4.3% of the total cost reported. Design phase overruns are not a major problem.

•

Based on the 362 overruns to date, the following would likely have occurred if estimates
had been subject to the 15% overrun limitation only after the design phase was completed:
•

59.7% of the right-of-way overrun causes would have been eliminated.
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•

"

57.3% of the utility relocation phase overrun causes would have been eliminated.

•

24.9% of construction overrun causes would potentially have been eliminated.

Changes in project scope as a result of worse than expected site conditions contributed
14.8% of the causes listed for design phase overruns; 7.0% for right-of-way overruns,
9. 0% for utility relocation overruns, and 14.1% for construction overruns. Increased site
investigation by designers and estimators might have reduced these overruns, however,
some soil conditions and contamination will always present problems.

•

Construction phase overruns accounted for nearly 2/3 of the total cost of all overruns. It
was stated that 24.9% of construction overrun cause occurrence could potentially be
eliminated if estimates were made after design was complete. An additional 31.1% of
overrun cause occurrences could be reduced if accurate unit bid price data were used.

•

Causes for overruns resulting from omissions in the estimates, transposing of numbers, or
switching of work between phases cannot be avoided unless estimates are updated
periodically.
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COST-PER-MILE MODEL

The Cost-per-mile Model is a computer based program, written in Microsoft EXCEL 5.0,
that:
a) allows an estimator to access the preconstruction and construction databases through
DBASE IV software and Microsoft QUERY,
b) allows an estimator to select a set of past projects that are similar to the new project,
c) processes the data related to the set of past projects producing an estimate based on
historical data,
d) allows an estimator to either accept the estimate based mi. historical data or to enter a
new estimate,
e) allows an estimator to specify metric or English units and an inflation factor for the
new project,
f) provides statistical information about the predicted accuracy of the new estimate

based on past projects, and
g) produces a Summary Sheet with the new estimate and important information about
what the model predicts.

The model, called KYEstimate, is very user-friendly. A copy of the program, with a
user's manual, was distributed to all of the twelve highway districts in December of 1995
and January of 1996. After allowing the estimators a few weeks to experiment with the
model, researchers went to each of the districts to answer any questions and get feedback
on the program.

Reception to the program varied across the state. While some estimators seemed pleased
to finally get some help with their conceptual estimates, other were not very receptive to
the program. Some had not even opened the software. The number one complaint of the
estimators was the size of the database. Many districts only had 15 to 20 projects and
therefore could not get a reasonable estimate.
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Estimators were also asked what parts of the program were most beneficial to them, or if
there were unnecessary components within the program. Many suggested that the work
type list was too defined, giving many maintenance projects that just would not be used.
Others suggested the program be made to perform in metric and an inflation factor be
applied to the estimate. Each highway district was left with a copy of their district's
projects and asked to make any corrections they felt were needed. ·Only five of the twelve
districts returned any information on their data.

After the visit with the districts, several changes were made to the model. Most were only
cosmetic changes.

Some of the data was moved around to make it easier for the

estimators to find. Item number became the primary identifier rather than TD-10 number.
Some classifications in the database were deleted because they were not valuable to the
estimators.

Perhaps one of the biggest changes involved the database. In order to make changes to
the databases, they were changed to DBASE IV files. Upon opening the program, the
database (either preconstruction or construction depending on what the user specifies)
would be pulled into the program using Microsoft QUERY. This protects the database
from being changed within the program, but allows someone to update the DBASE IV file
and send it to the districts.

Since the last interim report, the size of the construction database has increased by several
hundred projects.

The preconstruction database is currently the same size, but projects

will soon be added to it also. With this increase in projects, the model has become more
valuable, using a much larger database to predict unit costs. Estimators may throw out
projects with extremely high or low costs and still be left with plenty of projects to use for
their estimate.

.

A metric option was added to the program. The database is in English units, but once in
KYEstimate, it may be changed to metric. An inflation factor, default of 3%, is used on
the estimates.
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Projects in the database could be selected by nine key attributes:
1
2
3
4
5

District
Construction Fiscal Year
Construction Type
Route
WorkType

6
7
8
9

Number of Lanes
Functional Class
Length
Lane Width

District - state highway district or districts; by number 1 - 12
Construction Fiscal Year - year the construction phase took place
Construction Type - types of work done in construction phase (see appendix)
Route- number of road: 60, 109, etc.
Work Type- FHWA Order M5600.1A, 12/87 (see appendix)
Number oflanes - number oflanes involved
Functional classification

- KyTC classification system (see appendix)

Length - length in miles to three decimal points
Lane Width - the width of the particular route

EXAMPLE

A new estimate is needed for the construction phase of a 2-lane rural resurfacing project in
Clark County. The road length is three miles and includes shoulder improvements.

All information relevant to the estimate is provided on the Estimate Summary Sheet screen
shown in Figure 3.

After entering the information identifying the project, etc. (Estimate Identification, Figure

3), the estimator moves to the construction database and selects criteria to use in the
search for completed projects similar to the new project. The criteria are set by selecting
combinations of items under each of the headings in Table 3.

These items may be

combined by using logical queries. In the case of text, the queries may be AND, OR,

=,

etc. In the case of numbers, the queries may be =, >=, etc. A new system allows the user
to type in his/her selection and click the "Filter" button.
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THIS ESTIMATE GENERATED 8Y KYESTIMATE

PRO..JECT 10
ROAD NAME
DISTRICT

......

#

\ KYEstimate

ESTIMATOR
UNITS(ENG/METRICJ
DATE OF ESTIMATE

DESIGN

ROW

UTI LilY

CONSTR

lOTAL

43,62:6
15,612
75,552:
2:3,164

43,826

I

15,61 2:
75,552
23,164

II

MILES

DESIGN

ROW

UTI LilY

DIST
CONST_FY
CON_TYPE
ROUTE
'NORK TYPE
# LNSI
FCLASS I

LENGTH
LN_WUTH

Figure 3 - Estimate Summary Sheet

21

In this case, after trying various combinations, the estimator selects the following:
Construction database, District 1 , Construction Type H, Work Type 72,

~

lanes, and rural

roads. The search of the construction database using these criteria finds the projects data
shown in Table 6.
Table 6. Database Search Results

7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7

994
991

940637

12
10
9
10
I I
12
10

991
992
994
993
993
993
994
992
994

$32,976
$39,410
$42.447
$44,038
$47,797
$61,358
$73,352
$96,843
$129,21 I

164
$26,391
$35,208
$35,345
$37,115
$43,064
$43.720
$46,720
$50,707
$65,095
$75,552
$105,824
$133,087

The cost-per-mile of the selected past projects is calculated and presented on the screen
(Statistical Analysis, Figure 3).

The estimator can use the estimates for each phase determined by the means of the actual
costs of past projects in the selected set or enter a new estimate. If a new estimate is
entered, statistical information about the probability of the estimate's accuracy based on
past data is presented (User Estimate, Figure 3). The estimate to be used in the six-year
plan is shown (6 YP Estimate, Figure 3). The estimator then records the criteria used for
the set of projects used in the trial estimate (Search Criteria, Figure 3).

Also, any

justification for the new estimate being higher or lower than the historical data would
predict is recorded (Estimate Justification, Figure 3).

The model, while simple in concept, is actually quite complex.
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An experienced estimator would likely make a better estimate than would KYEstimate.
However, an experienced estimator is not always available, and it is sometimes difficult to
justifY an estimate when actual costs are quite different. Using KYEstimate and making a
new estimate in line with past experience is a conservative approach to conceptual
estimating and provides justification based on past experience.

23

CONCLUSIONS

The current process of forecasting costs for highway work in Kentucky isn't satisfactory to
either the K yTC or the Legislature.

The reporting requirements of the oversight law,

KRS45.245, impose additional work on the KyTC. The limits imposed, whereby reporting is
required, are in some cases impossible to meet, and, in other cases, possible to meet only with
additional staffing and/or by not performing current duties.

The current oversight requirement has resulted in 362 overruns worth over $162 million being
presented to the Interim Joint Committee on Transportation for review to date (7/1/92 7/1/96). All of these overruns have been approved. The UCT makes no concerted effort to
track cost underruns.

The overrun threshold, > 15%, is arbitrary and causes a lot of wasted effort by KyTC
personnel. It would be better to use different thresholds for different phases, or to allow
updating estimates once the design phase is completed and a better scope of work is available.

An improvement to the current process would be to require that only overruns over a certain

amount be formally presented to the IJCT and others require only a paper notification. The
amount would be determined by a statistical analysis of overruns during the past few years.

The conceptual estimating process can be improved by using actual costs of past projects to
develop estimates for new projects.
projects.

To do this requires that critical data be kept on all

KYEstimate can process historical data to allow estimators to use only those

projects with like characteristics when preparing a new estimate.

Estimates for right-of-way costs have not seen improvement with use of actual costs of past
projects. The cost-per-parcel model and database that was being developed showed a high
variation in unit cost and has been abandoned.
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Estimates are a product of experience and information.

Estimating experience has been

disappearing rapidly in the KyTC. It is vitally important to develop databases and make them
available to personnel throughout the state. These databases will not only improve estimating
ability but will serve to help justify estimates that later turn out to be inaccurate.

This study offers an opportunity to make improvements to KyTC's cost forecasting ability and
to the relationship between the KyTC and the Legislature. To seize this opportunity, both the
Legislature and the KyTC must communicate openly with each other, and with the researcher,
in an effort to find a workable solution which considers both political and fiscal realities.
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PRELIMINARY RECOMMENDATIONS

The following preliminary recommendations are made, based on the findings of the first three
years of this five-year study.

•

Look for innovative ways to improve both estimates and relations with the Legislature.

•

Educate legislators in the art/science of estimating and the limitations of what can be
done with current resources.

•

Develop statewide and regional databases of highway costs.

•

Assign more resources to estimating, with a method to account for their utilization.

•

Set up a budget from either new or reallocated funds for the estimating effort, so that a
cause and effect relationship can be established.

•

Develop a standard estimating procedure and train all estimating personnel on its use.

•

Establish a formal review policy and schedule for all estimates.

•

Require an estimator's name, date and estimate class for all estimates appearing on the

Project Authorization Form (TC-1 0).
•

IJCT adapt the oversight implementation to better track performance and reduce the
added burden on the KyTC.

•

Track project phase underruns of> 15% as well as overruns.

•

Limit formal reports of overruns to those that have a potential of being disapproved.

•

Instead of a flat> 15% limit, use different limits based on class of estimate.

•

Let projects be carried through Phase I design without the 15% limitation.

A small group, representing both legislators and the KyTC, should work with the researcher
to articulate details of a process that meets political and fiscal realities. This would facilitate
the implementation of needed improvements and lead to better relations within state
government.
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PATH FORWARD

Specific goals for year 4 are:
•

to refine the cost-per-mile database, KYEstimate,

•

to work with the KyTC to get project data recorded in a place and format that can be used
to update the databases being developed,

•

to improve the size and quality of both the preconstruction and construction databases

•

to develop tools and standard estimating procedures for KyTC estimators,

•

to develop a plan and a program to train KyTC personnel on the new estimating tools and
procedures, and

•

to maintain contact with officials within the KyTC and the Legislature in an effort to
develop a cost forecasting strategy that will satisfy both parties and will benefit the citizens
of Kentucky.
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APPENDIX
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Construction Type
1

Planning phase, project planning studied

p

2

Design phase, design projects

D

3

Right-of-way phase, right-of-way projects

R

4

Construction phase

u

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f
g.
h.

Grade, drain, and surfacing
Grade, drain
Surfacing on new route or reconstruction
Bridge construction
Roadside improvement
Traffic Services
Services facilities
Resurfacing

c
G

s

B
I
T
F
H
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Work Type Classification
10

New Route

20

Relocation

31

Reconstruction to Freeway

32

Reconstruction with More Lanes

33

Reconstruction to Wider Lanes

34

Pavement Reconstruction with Alignment
Improvements

35

Pavement Reconstruction

40

Major Widening

50

Minor Widening

60

Restoration and Rehabilitation

60A

Pavement Milling and Bituminous Overlay

60B

Replace Cross Drains

60C

Install Edge Drains

60D

Correct Embankment Slide/Slide Correction

60E

Spot Improvements/Patching

60F

Install Median Drains

60G

Replace Storm Sewer

60H

Culvert Replacement

60I

Break, Seat, and Place Bituminous Overlay,
Install Pavement edge drains, remove/
replace/reset guardrail as necessary

60K

Off Ramps on Interstate

60L

Guardrail

71

Resurfacing with Shoulder Improvements
and Portland Cement Concrete Pavement
Restoration

72

Resurfacing with Shoulder Improvements
and Bituminous Pavement Restoration

30

77

Resurfacing with Portland Cement Concrete
Pavement Restoration

78

Resurfacing with Bituminous Pavement
Restoration

80

Bridge Replacement

81

Bridge Rehabilitation

83

Culvert

lOOA

Replace or Refurbish Signs

IOOB

Construct One Tum Lane

lOOC

Construct More Than One Tum Lane

lOOE

Reconstruct Intersection

lOOEA

Construct Intersection

lOOF

Install Signs and Signals at Intersection

IOOG

Construct Flush Median

IOOJ

Construct Sidewalk

lOOK

Improve Sight Distance

lOOL

Construct Access Road/Entrance

lOOM

Construct Welcome Center

lOON

Construct Interchange Ramps

1000

Install Lighting

lOOP

Pavement Markers

107

Environmental

109J

Fill Slip Corrections
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Functional Class Codes
1

Rural Principal Arterial - Interstate

RPAI

2

Rural Principal Arterial - Other

RPAO

6

Rural Minor Arterial - Other

RMNA

7

Rural Major Collector

RMJC

8

Rural Minor Collector

RMIC

9

Rural Local Road

RLR

11

Urban Principal Arterial - Interstate

UPAI

12

Urban Principal Arterial -Freeway/Expressway

UPAFE

14

Urban Other Principal Arterial

UOPA

16

Urban Minor Arterial

UMNA

17

Urban Collector

uc

19

Urban Local Street

ULS
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